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Religion and the Body: 
Rematerializing the Human Body 
the Social Sciences of Religion* 
MEREDITH B. McGUIREt 
. 
Ill 
The social sciences of religion could be transformed by taking seriously the fact that humans 
are embodied. A new conceptualization of a mindful body has the potential to lead to profound shifts 
in how we view our subjects and their worlds. Our research strategies need to take into account that 
believers (and nonbelievers) are not merely disembodied spirits, but that they experience a material 
world in and through their bodies. Greater awareness of the social and political uses of human bodies 
should guide our research and theory. 
The human body probably seems like the most unlikely imaginable theme for a 
presidential address to this society, but this focus may lead us to some considerations 
that are central to social sciences and to religion today. Let me begin with an apocryphal 
creation tale: 
The Lord was planning for life on earth one day. She'd already done the mountains and streams 
part, and finished birds, beasts, flowers, and veggies, sunrise and sunset - lots of work - and the 
Lord saw that it was good. 
Now the Lord was concerned that the arrangements for human life should be just perfect, so 
She summoned all the top angel social scientists of religion for consultation [and in heaven, social 
sciences of religion have a lot more respect than we're used to, so there were plenty of highly trained 
experts to consult]. 
The conference lasted for weeks, and the Lord had to jettison the plan to have the whole job 
done in less than seven days. Angel social scientists presented an entire detailed proposal, anticipating 
human opinions and beliefs, human emotions and attitudes, human social organization and roles -
every theme ever raised in the Angel Journal of Social Sciences of Religion. 
The Lord seemed impressed by much of the proposal but kept having difficulty envisioning some 
central aspects about what humanity was going to mean. At first, the angels thought maybe the 
problem was social science jargon, but then they reminded themselves that the Lord's omniscience 
could overcome that obstacle. So, maybe something was omitted from the plan. 
Finally, the Lord said: "Colleagues, these ideas are very promising. These findings about humans 
having opinions, attitudes, values, and ideas are certainly going to be useful. Something seems to 
be missing, though; it all seems a little unreal - and I want this earth project to be real. So, what 
if - I mean, try to imagine for a moment, just what if these humans had bodies???" 
Now that is a key question for us: What if people - the subjects of our research and 
theorizing - had material bodies? Present social science conceptions of our subjects are 
peculiarly disembodied. Whether we are analyzing individual believers or religious organiza-
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tions or religious ideas, the relationship of humans to their own bodies and to the bodies 
of others is remote or altogether absent from most of our work. How might our under­
standing of religion be different if we proceed  as though the people involved had bodies? 
This brief sketch of some connections between religion and the body is meant to make 
the body matter in two senses of the word. First, the body should be an important com­
ponent of our consideration of social aspects of religion. Bodies are important; they matter 
to the persons who inhabit them, and religions speak to many of these body-oriented human 
concerns. Part of the reason our bodies matter to us is that we strongly identify our very 
selves with our bodies. We experience things done to our bodies as done to our selves. 
Our agency as active personae in society is accomplished through our bodies. Merleau­
Ponty (1962:37) has reminded us, "Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 
'I think that' but of 'I can'." Thus, loss of that agency (for example, through disability, 
enslavement, or repression) is experienced as a fundamental assault upon our selves. 1 
Because of this intimate linkage, attention to how people's bodies matter to them can 
give social scientists valuable clues to the nature of the connection between individual 
and society. 
Second, bodies are matter. The material reality of our bodies is part of the grounding 
of human experience in reality: The "lived" body is our vehicle for perceiving and inter­
preting our world. As material reality, human bodies also vividly experience the material 
conditions of social existence. Society inscribes itself upon the concrete bodies of its 
members. For example, it is not abstract lungs that are filled with fluid after years of 
working in a textile factory; nor is it merely an idea of a famine-stricken child who dies 
of malnutrition and dehydration. 
Because bodies are matter in this second sense of the word, they are linked with other 
material realities. Let us remind ourselves that real bodies conceive, bear, and nurse 
children. Real bodies suffer illness, pain, chronic disabilities, and death. Real bodies 
experience hunger and cold. Real bodies also experience pleasure - aesthetic pleasures, 
sexual pleasures, and sensuous pleasures, such as the embrace of a friend, a view of a 
breathtaking sunset, the sound of a lullaby, a gentle caress, the aroma of fresh bread. 
Real bodies labor and are shaped by their work, whether by the constraints of the mine 
shaft or the video display terminal, whether by toxic chemicals or the stressful workplace. 
In addition (and this is also relevant to an understanding of religion in the world today), 
let us remember that real bodies are victims of abuse, torture, and war. As social scien­
tists of religion, we could greatly expand the depth of our understanding of society if 
we were to "re-materialize" the human body. 
Our discipline has been impoverished by the fact that it has been so heavily influenced 
by an epistemological tradition, itself a cultural and historical construction, in which things 
of the spirit have been radically split from material things, and in which mind is considered 
separate from body.2 We have neatly divided our subdisciplines along the lines of this 
1. Note that Giddens's ( 1984) structuration theory also emphasized the importance of the active embodied 
subject (i.e., "agency"), reflexively engaged in concrete social I spatial I temporal contexts. 
2. See Gordon 1988, for a succinct discussion of the impact of Enlightenment naturalism on contemporary 
Western societies' operant cosmologies and ontologies; see also Comaroff 1982; Schepper· Hughes and Lock 1987; 
Kirmeyer 1988; Osherman and Amara-Singham 1981. 
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dualism: The "mind I spirit" part goes to the social scientists and religious studies scholars, 
while the "body" part (translated by some as "really real") goes to the biologists and 
medical scientists. It is counterproductive for us, individually and professionally, to con­
tinue to accept uncritically the assumptions of this mind I body dualism. Rather, let us 
assume that the human body is both a biological and a cultural product, simultaneously 
physical and symbolic, existing always in a specific social and environmental context in 
which the body is both active agent and yet shaped by each social moment and its 
history. To remind us of this unitary quality, Schepper-Hughes and Lock (1987) have 
referred to it as the "mindful body." We must reconceptualize mind, body and society, 
not as merely connected, but indeed as deeply interpenetrating, meshed as a near­
unitary phenomenon. 
This essay is but a brief sketch of some suggested directions for how the social sciences 
of religion might come to a better appreciation of this mindful body. These suggestions 
are here organized along three broad themes: 
1) the body's importance in selfexperience and self's experience of others; 
2) the body's role in the production and reflection of social meanings; 
3) the body's significance as the subject and object of power relations. 
These three themes draw from various theoretical approaches, with diverse epistemological 
assumptions, but collectively they suggest both the importance of considering the mind­
ful body and some possible directions for future inquiry. 
This preliminary agenda indicates aspects of special importance for the scientific study 
of religion, for we are already keenly interested in religion's relationship to individual selves, 
to socio-cultural meanings, and to the theme of power. 
THE BODY AND SELF EXPERIENCE 
The living body is our fundamental phenomenological basis for apprehending self and 
society. Each person's body as it is concretely experienced, as it is "lived," is fundamentally 
different from the body as it is objectively observed (cf. Schrag 1979). For example, my 
hand, as a part of me, is not the same as the entity which my doctor sees when observing 
it for signs of injury; it is not the same as the object of my music teacher's attention 
when advising about my fingering; it is not the same as the object of my students' atten­
tion when I am writing on the chalkboard. My hand, as an integral part of the living 
body, is identified with my self. As Marcel (1952:315) emphasized, "I do not make use 
of my body. I am my body." We experience actions done to our bodies as done to our 
very selves. 
Our bodies are manifestations of our selves in our everyday worlds. At the same time, 
embodiment is our way of knowing those worlds and interacting with them. Through our 
bodies, we see, feel, hear, perceive, touch, smell, and we hold our everyday worlds. While 
each individual is uniquely embodied, the experience is also profoundly social. For example, 
our experience with our bodies is mediated by learned roles and other expectations; it 
is shaped by the immediate social context, as well as by historical antecedents of which 
the individual may not even be aware; and it is apprehended and communicated indirectly 
through language and other cultural symbols. 
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If we abandon our dualistic notions of how humans relate to their worlds, we should 
consider the possibility that the body has a direct role in knowing (see Csordas forth­
coming). Exploring the somatic component of ways of knowing may give us a better 
approach for understanding alternate states of reality, religious healing, the effective­
ness of ritual, and such spiritual modes of knowledge as "discernment," "prophecy," 
"anointing," and so on. For example, a number of years ago, a colleague of mine, Peter 
Freund, was studying some of the somatic features of meditation in the Divine Light 
Mission. He was frustrated that, as a sociologist, he could not deal with "premies' " reports 
of actually tasting spiritual "nectar" and seeing lights during meditation, without implicitly 
disconfirming the somatic reality of those experiences. 
My examples of how our understanding of the body and self-experience might inform 
our analysis of religion are drawn from two very disparate fields: (a) the study of illness, 
pain and suffering, and (b) analyses of gendered bodily experience. 
Illness, Pain and Suffering 
My focus on the body as a matter of sociological interest grew out of my study of 
ritual forms of healing, such as Christian or psychic or Eastern forms of religious healing. 
These healing groups utilized body rituals as ways of transforming their selves. 3 Consis­
tent with its underlying Cartesian dualism, Western medicine treats illness as a 
pathological condition of the body; illness for which no physiological pathology can be 
identified is often assumed to be psychosomatic, practically translated as "all in the head," 
and therefore is treated as fundamentally unreal. Because these paradigmatic "blinders" 
are so thoroughly learned in medical training, many doctors are unable to deal with their 
patients' experiences of illness, pain, and suffering and so they subsequently disconfirm 
those experiences. 
Suspending the dualistic approach of biomedicine, we find that illness is a profoundly 
human experience. It calls into question normal expectations about our bodies and 
capacities. When illness is not part of our life, we take the relationship between our bodies 
and our selves for granted. Indeed, we are not likely to think about our bodies or to be 
particularly conscious of many bodily sensations. In health, we expect our bodies to be 
able to function, to sustain a presentation of our selves as normal, reliable participants 
in social interaction (Dingwall 1976:98). What we call "illness" is a disturbance in body 
processes or experience that has become problematic for the individual. 
The experience of illness, even if only temporary, reminds us of our limitations, our 
dependencies (present and potential), and our ultimate mortality. Our bodies inform us 
that they cannot always be counted on to be "able" for what we want them to do. Since 
our important social relationships, our very sense of who we are, are intimately connected 
with our bodies and their routine functioning, being ill is disruptive and disordering. We 
identify our selves with our bodies, as exemplified by one injured person's introspective 
account: 
What seemed, at first, to be no more than a local peripheral breakage and breakdown now showed 
itself in a different, and quite terrible, light - as a breakdown of memory, of thinking, of will - not 
just a lesion in my muscle, but a lesion in me" (Sacks 1984:67; emphasis in original). 
3. Similar transformation of the body-self can be seen in the ritual process of the pilgrimage, which is a bodily 
transition in space and time (see Frankenberg 1986). 
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Most everyday illnesses are not profoundly disruptive, although they, too, remind 
the sufferer of personal limits and dependencies. Other illnesses, however, are deeply disrup­
tive, threatening important relationships, the individual's exercise of personal agency, 
and the ill person's very sense of self. Several features of such disruptive illness highlight 
the intimate connection between body experience and sense of self (see Murphy 1987). 
Loss is one factor that can make an illness experience profoundly disruptive. People 
actively grieve, because the loss of body parts (e.g., amputation of an arm) or body functions 
(e.g., partial blindness) represent a loss of integrity, a disruption of the wholeness of the 
person (Cassell 1982). People suffer, not only from loss of present capacities and roles, 
but also from being robbed of their future: the teenager who is paraplegic after a car acci­
dent, the young and childless woman who has a hysterectomy, the elderly musician whose 
arthritis makes playing a beloved instrument impossible. 
Chronic illness and pain, in particular, force the sufferer to come to new terms with 
time. Sometimes life-threatening acute illness or a serious accident has this kind of impact, 
but acute illness is by definition temporary. Chronic illness often leads to a radical re­
assessment, in light of changed and yet-changing capacities, of one's self in relationship 
to past and future. The experience of chronic illness involves both a sense of loss and 
a heightened self-consciousness (Charmaz 1983, 1987). Chronic pain poses basic problems 
for the sufferer's sense of self. Unlike acute pain, chronic pain is a "somatic reminder 
that things are not right and may never be right. This reminder, phenomenally situated 
in one's own body, is inescapable" (Hilbert 1984:370). The body as subjectively experienced 
is transformed into an object with pain, resulting in a form of alienation from one's own 
body. In one "moment one is one's body; [in) the next one has a body" (Bergsma 1982:111). 
Illness is also especially damaging to the self when it is experienced as overwhelm· 
ing, unpr-edictabk and uncontrollabk. Such illness paralyzes the person's ability to manage 
life, to plan, to act - in short, to exercise agency. Enormous attention must be given, 
not merely to actual crisis periods in the illness, but also to such minute, mundane worries 
as: "Can I negotiate the path from my car to the store?" (cf. Kleinman 1988:44). Unpredict­
ability and uncontrollability result in a disjunction between the person and the body; the 
taken-for-granted functioning is gone and the person experiences, in effect, "I cannot count 
on my body; 'it' fails me." The body becomes "other," at best an unpredictable ally. 
Such experiences of suffering, pain, and illness are not merely "in the body" or "in 
the mind or spirit"; rather, they are experienced by the whole person as assaults on the 
self. For this reason, many attempts to identify and measure a person's "well-being" are 
obfuscated by the extent to which an individual's phenomenal "being well" involves a 
complex interface of such emotional and social influences in that persons' very bodily 
experiences. 
If we approach pain and suffering from the perspective of Cartesian dualism, we end 
up with an image of religious re!ponses as epiphenomena! add-ons, something the mind 
was doing after the body was suffering. This perspective has led to a sociology of religion 
which has focused exclusively on ideas about the body and its suffering: e.g., theodicies 
(a highly useful concept, but limited by its idealistic assumptions). If, by contrast, we 
have an image of a mindful body, then spiritual responses may be simultaneously part 
of the mindful-body responses to pain and illness. Thus, we can better understand the 
impact of religion on the body itself, not just on ideas about the body. 
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Gendered Bodies 
If our bodies are important in our self-experience, how does it affect my being that 
I am embodied in the world as a female rather than as a male? Biologically deterministic 
answers to this question result in incredible, simplistic pictures of "engendered" bodies. 
Probably only minimal aspects of self�xperience are derived solely from biological factors, 
exclusive of cultural and historical influence. There are very few (if any) self-experiential 
features, characteristic of all women in all cultures_ and times, which they share by virtue 
only of their being embodied as females, and which no men share due to their embodi­
ment as males (Gerber 1979). Culture shapes even experiences of biological events such 
as childbirth and menopause; the fact of female embodiment is not sufficient to predict 
the individual's experience of self even during such intensely biophysical processes. 
On the other hand, gender is not irrelevant to one's self-experience. All features of 
our embodiment affect our interaction with our social and physical environments. For 
example, if my body is extremely thin, or if I am exceptionally beautiful, if I am missing 
a leg, or if I have brown skin, if I cannot see, or if I am tall - all such features of my 
embodiment affect how I interact with my world and, indirectly, my self-experience. 
However, as the above examples of experiences of pain and illness show, the influence 
of this embodiment on people's self-experience is not simply a matter of individual varia­
tion. If my culture teaches its members to respond to blu�yed persons as highly valued, 
and I happen to be embodied as blue�yed, then I have a disproportionate likelihood of 
experiencing my blu�yed self as valuable, as honored. Likewise, if my culture holds that 
femaleness is dangerous, polluting, ensnaring, and I happen to be embodied as female, 
then my self-experience is likely to be influenced by this cultural evaluation. Note that 
it is not just that I have an idea of negative values about women; rather, to the extent 
that I have internalized these interpretations, I experience them as part of my experience 
of my own body, my own self. 
As influential as these socially constructed gender valuations may be, however, they 
are not fixed or deterministic. Rather, social constructions of gender are fluid, and the 
power to control the reconstruction of "engendered" embodiment (for instance, in the 
context of changing contemporary societies) is specifically political power (as described 
further below; cf., Bourdieu 1977:165-168). One good place to begin an appreciation of 
that social reconstruction is precisely the realm of emerging religious ritual, myth, and 
narrative (Cooey 1989). Some interesting research in women's studies and religion is in­
vestigating these attempts to reconstruct integrations of body-mind and culture-nature. 
Thus, it is tackling central issues, not just quaint little peripheral topics for separate ses­
sions at professional meetings. 
THE BODY AND SOCIAL MEANINGS 
Our discipline has been aware, at least since Durkheim, that human bodies are 
important symbols of cultural and social structural meanings. Body symbolism is 
important in our cosmologies. Similarly, imagery drawn from the body - its parts, its 
postures, its functions - is linked with conceptions of the self and its relationship to a 
larger material and social environment. 
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Numerous anthropological studies have revealed that often the bodily localization 
of a particular illness represents culturally meaningful idioms of distress. For example, 
when an Iranian woman complains of a "pressed heart," her expression of distress is linked 
with a larger set of social concerns: infertility, attractiveness, sexual intercourse, pollu­
tion, old age (Good 1977). There exists also a substantial literature on body imagery, as 
linked with body boundary conceptions, distortions in body perceptions, perceived locus 
of control, and so on. Little of this literature has, however, been brought to bear upon 
the study of religion, perhaps because so much of the focus was upon psychopathological 
situations assumed to be irrelevant to normal religiosity. 
Some 15 years ago, a minor study attempted to identify the salience of traditional 
Christian body symbolism for a sample of hospitalized persons diagnosed as schizophrenic 
and for a presumably normal sample. The analysis foundered, due primarily to the author's 
incorrect assumption that the social meanings of Christian body symbolism could be 
derived deductively from theology. Nevertheless, some of his conclusion is probably 
accurate: that none of the traditional Christian body symbols, as defined in their theological 
purity, holds strong salience for contemporary believers, whether schizophrenic or not 
(Ruth 1974). 
While this finding probably surprises no one, we should not be too quick to assume 
that therefore no body symbolism or personal body imagery has powerful significance 
for modem W estemers. Indeed, the prominence of body imagery in media advertizing, 
in the culture of fitness, in the worlds of popular music, literature, sport and art, all suggest 
that body symbolism and personal body imagery are of central importance in under­
standing modem social structure, culture, and personality. Religious and quasi-religious 
themes are clearly important in this symbolism. 
Symbolic and structuralist anthropologists have considered the human body, its parts 
(e.g., specific organs), and products (e.g., tears, milk, blood) to be something of a cognitive 
pattern or map, representing important social relations. Mary Douglas (1966, 1970) has 
reminded us that the body is a "natural symbol" which can be used metaphorically at 
several levels of meaning simultaneously. She observed how concerns about the body 
frequently are metaphors for social concerns, such as order and boundary maintenance. 
The cosmology of the Qollahuayas of the South American Andes exemplifies this 
metaphorical linkage of the social body with the individual body. This people identifies 
the human anatomy with their mountain environment; both mountain and body have 
head, chest, breast and nipple, heart, stomach, feet, etc. Illness is attributed to disrup­
tions between people and the land; social conflicts between, for example, the residents 
of the heart and the residents of the feet must be resolved by healing, a ceremony by 
which concerned members ritually feed and restore wholeness to the mountain and thus 
to the group (Bastien 1985). 
In a similar vein, Victor Turner (1968) observed that the healing rituals of the Ndembu 
tribe of Africa acted upon the body of the afflicted metaphorically to heal social conflicts 
in the larger social group. My own research on spiritual healing among middle-class 
American suburbanites found remarkably similar metaphorical linkages between individual 
bodies and social bodies. Healing results were often accomplished through the actual 
practice of a metaphorical connection or transition. For example, in a Jain yoga and 
meditation group, the metaphor of a well person as a firmly grounded, erect, and balanced 
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tree was literally effected through the practice of the "tree pose" (McGuire 1988). 
A larger part of the effectiveness of the social meanings of the body is that they do 
not need to operate at the level of consciousness. In socialization, the individual acquires, 
to some degree, what Bourdieu (1977:124) has called "a socially informed body," which 
is structured by its learned tastes and distastes. Its socially shaped senses include not 
only such senses as smell or touch, but also the sense of beauty, business sense, sense 
of propriety, moral sense, sense of humor, sense of the sacred, sense of responsibility, 
and so on. For example, in America, the socially informed body senses both the distinc­
tive odor of the underarm and the culturally appropriate revulsion to it. Similarly, the 
socially informed body experiences not only the bodily sensation of a burn, but also the 
culturally shaped sense that this is pain. 
As socially constructed reality, however, these senses, along with their practical use 
in everyday human life, are open to change. Since traditional Western body schemata 
are no longer taken for granted as givens, a struggle over the power to define these 
symbols is evident. Bourdieu (1977:165) has reminded us, "The specifically symbolic power 
to impose [such] principles of the construction of reality ... is a major dimension of 
political power." 
Religion has historically had a prominent role in such symbolic power. Contemporary 
official religion enjoys far less power in shaping today's "socially informed body," but 
religions and quasi-religions are still very much involved in the struggle for symbolic power, 
and specifically over the meanings of the body and its senses. Good examples are the 
meanings proferred (both as ideas and as "senses") by such diverse movements as New 
Age religions, the anti-abortion movement, movements for alternative women's spirituality, 
Creationism, and the Green movement. 
Consistent with our aim of re-materializing the body, however, we must remember 
that body ritual is not merely the manipulation of abstract symbols derived from the 
body. Rather, it is always produced in the context of specific ecological, economic, and 
social conditions (Bourdieu 1977:113ff.) - thus its political significance and its potential 
role in social change, as well as in social stability. So the social meanings of the body 
are necessarily linked with the political body. 
THE BODY AND POWER RELATIONS 
The expression of specific power relationships in body terms, as illustrated by the 
writings of ancient and medieval philosophers, is a very old practice. An impressive 
example of the political uses of body imagery is the medieval fiction of the king's two 
bodies (one being natural and subject to passions and death, the other being the body 
politic). Accordingly, the king was incorporated as head with his subjects in the body 
politic, which was not subject to death or passions (see O'Neill 1985:67-90). In these political 
uses of the body, religion often figured importantly as a legitimating force for the exercise 
of power and privilege. 
The social sciences of religion have, from the classical formulations of Freud, Marx, 
and Weber to the present, focused primarily upon religion's role in the social control of 
the body. Much of this theorizing, however, has been flawed by assumptions of a mind­
body dualism (and in many cases there has been disproportionate emphasis upon 
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cognitive processes).4 O'Neill (1985:48) has suggested that this bias may be due to our 
preference for imagining ourselves as being controlled through ideas and consensual rela­
tionships, since the prospect of being controlled through the body and coercive relation­
ships seems slavish. 
By uncritically accepting a body-mind dualism and tending toward cognitive biases 
in understanding social control, however, the social sciences may be unable to grasp the 
enormous potency of modern social control mechanisms. O'Neill (1985:152) has argued 
that we must "think of all technology as biotechnology - to see ... that every power 
over nature is a power over ourselves. Such power is not only present in our machines 
but proliferates in the discursive production of the human sciences designed to control 
life, thought, health, sanity, and knowledge " (emphasis in the original). 
The relative lack of importance of explicitly religious legitimations for contemporary 
social control (at least, in the public sphere) may distract us from awareness of the highly 
ideological, but masked as rational, elements of potent forms of social control. Modem 
forms of social control, masked as therapy, masked as medical intervention, masked as 
workplace incentives, masked as entertainment, are particularly potent, because they 
operate indirectly upon the person's entire mindful body. Contemporary masks for 
ideological exercises of power over people make these forms of social control especially 
insidious. 
The following suggests a few concrete examples of how the human body is linked, 
directly and indirectly, with power relations in modem Western societies. 
The Body at Work 
At an elementary level, work is something embodied individuals do to sustain 
themselves. We work to obtain and prepare food; we work to clothe and shelter ourselves 
and our families; we work to arrange our lives within our physical and social environ­
ment. Some crippling of mind and body occurs as a byproduct of all forms of work. For 
example, when I am bending over a hoe to till a field, my mind and body become tired, 
perhaps misshapen or broken, regardless of whether it is my field or that of an agribusiness, 
regardless of whether my labor will feed me and my family adequately or poorly. 
Marx observed, however, that certain work relationships are particularly crippling, 
such as when the division of labor separates mental from physical labor, and when the 
conditions of work create an alienation from self and from inner and outer environment. 
Marx (1977:548) noted, "Factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uppermost, 
at the same time it stifles and restricts the free expression of mind and body." 
Work under early capitalist modes of production required different bodies from those 
working under other forms of production. One important function of social control then 
became the development and maintenance of the appropriate bodies for wage labor. Not 
only within the factory itself, but also in the educational system and (to some extent) 
within the family, social control mechanisms contributed toward producing bodies ready 
for work under capitalism: They needed to be docile, capable of being constrained to do 
4. For a critical review of this literature and a proposed corrective point of departure for further theorizing 
about the mindful body, see Freund, 1988. 
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repetitive tasks in a limited range of motion, and controlled enough to take breaks for 
food, elimination or rest only at times allowed by management. Such bodies must fit 
themselves to the time, space, and motion limitations of production. 
In modern forms of production, social control and the production of appropriate bodies 
are just as important, but the nature of the desirable worker has been redefined, and in­
creasingly the modes of social control operate internally. A good example is the socializa­
tion of flight attendants, as documented by Hochschild (1983). An integral part of the 
flight attendants' work is the production of emotional responses to customers that are 
consistent with the company's image of service and friendliness. In training, flight 
attendants are schooled, not merely to act friendly and helpful, but indeed to try to make 
themselves feel those attitudes and emotions. Modern methods of workplace management 
often effectively disguise power issues: Well-trained workers come to view social control 
as merely "self-control." Nevertheless, workers' mindful bodies can be hurt, diseased, or 
broken, even by these seemingly more benign forms of social control. Indeed, there is 
impressive evidence that many of today's debilitating chronic diseases are byproducts 
of harmful emotional and bodily "self-control" (Freund 1982, 1988). 
The Disciplined Body 
Not only in the arena of work, but also in most major institutional spheres, modern 
bodies are disciplined bodies. Foucault has argued that contemporary societies have 
developed numerous "technologies of power" to regulate the body, bodily expression, 
attitudes, emotions, and emotional expression simultaneously. Accordingly, these forms 
of social control, because they work subtly upon the body and mind at once, are more 
potent, not merely assuring superficial compliance but indeed capable of penetrating the 
individual's "soul." In contrast to simple, repressive social control, these mechanisms 
are constitutive, generating forces (Foucault 1980, 1977). 
Bryan Turner's work (1984) has failed to appreciate Foucault's emphasis upon how 
society acts upon the body itself; however, his analysis does build fruitfully upon Weber's 
theories of rationalization. Body discipline is, in many respects, a prime example of modern 
rationalizing tendencies: In the disenchanted world, all aspects of life become subordinated 
to bureaucratically organized patterns of behavior, i.e., regimens. Turner has examined 
body regimens like diet, table manners, exercise, and hygiene as rationalization of human 
bodies consistent with the exercise of power in modern social structures (Turner 1984). 
He has also noted that modern body regimen aims to reproduce not only disciplined 
workers, but also disciplined consumers, who have learned to need to consume system­
atically a vast array of special foods, cosmetics, medicines, clothes, leisure activities, and 
so on. 
The comprehensive discipline of mind and body evident in these regimens becomes 
a peculiarly modern form of asceticism. Anyone who doubts this role of regimen has but 
to spend a week trying to practice the fitness prescription of "gung-ho" health spa. Each 
meal, each muscle group, each pattern of breathing, each posture, becomes subject to 
its specified discipline. Furthermore, there are ideological supports for these regimens, 
which transform "bad" body practices into modern forms of sin, for which the individual 
is held morally responsible (Crawford 1984; Glassner 1989). 
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These uses of body discipline, and their linkage with modem forms of legitimation 
of power and modes of social control, suggest that they are certainly appropriate focuses 
for the social sciences of religion. 
Power and Female Bodies 
As noted above, gender is one important element shaping how the individual perceives 
self and the world. The "engendered" body is also both the instrument of power and the 
site of struggles over power. The most obvious power struggle is in the arena of reproduc­
tive control, in which religious legitimations and organizations are prominent. Numerous 
micro-technologies of power, subtle little practices, also are used to subordinate female 
bodies; for example, the power to touch or to interrupt another are assertions of power 
used far more frequently by men towards women than by women or by men towards other 
men (see Henley 1977). 
Following Foucault, Bordo (1989) has analyzed how the cultural definition of femininity 
is inscribed upon women's bodies. As with the workers' bodies, power is exercised over 
female bodies, not merely by external social controls, but also from within. They become 
"docile bodies," "useful bodies," whose energies and expressions are regulated and "im­
proved" by the organization of women's regimens of diet, make-up, clothing, schedule, 
and space. In this context, Bordo has suggested that we might best understand several 
women's disorders as political gestures of defiance against the social controls of femininity. 
Contemporary pathologies, such as bulemia, anorexia, and agoraphobia, could constitute 
protests. 5 Although they are ultimately self-defeating and counterproductive. They may 
be viewed as assertions of power and sexuality in the face of modem "technologies of 
power" which inform women that, to be appropriately feminine, they must control what 
they eat and limit what space they may occupy. Bordo has suggested that modem 
feminists need to examine critically their own assumptions that women should manage 
their bodies to fit a newly defined "politically correct" body. Are women necessarily more 
free when, instead of practicing walking in high heels and girdles, they now exercise extra­
ordinary bodily management in weight-lifting, martial arts, and marathon running? 
The Political Abuse of Bodies: Torture and War 
Another political use of bodies is to torture and kill them. These are hardly new prac­
tices, but contemporary societies seem to spend considerable effort to expand and refine 
their methods for these tasks. Elaine Scarry's (1985) difficult book, The Body in Pain, 
has argued that political torture exists to convert the real pain of the victim into the 
fiction of power of the torturer. The structure of torture shows that it systematically robs 
the sufferer of agency and even of a voice to express the self in pain; simultaneously, 
the torturer appropriates that agency to its collective self (e.g., a regime). Scarry states: 
5. Similarly, Lock (1989) has argued that many expressions of illness, such as the culturally wide-spread "attack 
of nerves," are political statements, i.e., counter-assertions against the power structures that simultaneously 
rob the subordinate of an effective voice. 
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In the very process [torture] uses to produce pain within the body of the prisoner, it bestows visibility 
on the structure and enormity of what is usually private and incommunicable, contained within the 
boundaries of the sufferer's body. It then goes on to deny, to falsify, the reality of the very thing 
it has itself objectified by a perceptual shift which converts the vision of suffering into the wholly 
illusory but, to the torturers and the regime they represent, wholly convincing spectacle of power 
(Scarry 1985:27). 
While not legitimated by the putative needs of a regime, similar ends are accomplished 
by rape and spouse abuse: The violence transforms the suffering of the victim into the 
fiction of power of the rapist or abusive partner. While not explicitly condoning these 
acts of violence, many religious groups in this society tell the victims, in effect, that they 
are responsible for their own suffering (for example, that the rape or abuse would not 
have occurred if the woman had been a "good girl"). 
Similarly, Scarry has argued that war is an exercise of power over bodies, in part 
because it takes place between political bodies and between bodies of armies, and in part 
also because it accomplishes its ends specifically by the destruction of human bodies. 
When it suits political ends, the casualties of war are glossed over; instruments of destruc­
tion are renamed with words like "cherry picker" or "little boy," and the enemy is described 
as "neutralized," "cleaned out," "liquidated." The physical issue of dead and wounded 
bodies is translated into verbal issues, such as freedom or fatherland or jihad or racial 
purity or national security, and so on. Scarry concludes: 
The dispute that leads to the war involves a process by which each side calls into question the 
legitimacy and thereby erodes the reality of the other country's issues, beliefs, ideas, self·conception. 
Dispute leads relentlessly to war not only because war is an extension and intensification of dispute 
but because it is a correction and reversal of it. That is, the injuring not only provides a means of 
choosing between disputants but also provides, by its massive opening of human bodies, a way of 
reconnecting the derealized and disembodied beliefs with the force and power of the material world 
(Scarry 1985: 128). 
This discussion is a useful cautionary reminder of the dehumanizing consequences 
of certain political uses of human bodies. In the past and present, religious institutions 
have often legitimated (and frequently directly participated in) torture and war. In the 
face of the horrors of modern warfare and gross abuses of power, religion is also one 
important source of a prophetic voice for human rights and peace. 
CONCLUSION 
The social sciences of religion could be transformed by taking seriously the fact that 
humans are embodied. A new conceptualization of a mindful body has the potential to 
lead to profound shifts in how we view our subjects and their worlds. Our research 
strategies need to take into account that believers (and nonbelievers) are not merely 
disembodied spirits, but that they experience a material world in and through their bodies. 
Greater awareness of the social and political uses of human bodies should guide our 
research and theory. 
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